To what extent are deliberative theories of democracy progressive? Limitations and shortcomings

Abstract

This article aims to briefly contextualize two of the most prominent deliberative theories of democracy, namely those developed by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Subsequently, it questions the actual capacity of these theoretical frameworks to challenge prevailing relations of oppression - understood here as the core of what constitutes a progressive stance. Although these theories propose expanding participation in the discursive sphere to achieve disinterested rational consensus and, thus, establish new forms of sociability through a more just, inclusive, and equitable political practice, it is argued that their intellectual proposals ultimately favor and mask dominant perspectives. A dynamic that harms marginalized groups whose modes of expression do not align with hegemonic standards of rationality. Furthermore, the article contends that deliberative models of democracy overemphasize the rejection of conflict and dissent, elements deemed essential for more impactful political transformation. Therefore, it is argued that a form of underlying conservatism permeates such theories, rendering them less capable of confronting existing relations of domination and, consequently, limiting their purportedly progressive character.