Exploring doxastic responsibility
Keywords:
Ethical Reflections. Doxastic Responsibility. Beliefs and Actions.Abstract
In this article, we will explore the foundations of doxastic responsibility, considering philosophical theories and practical examples. We will investigate how our beliefs shape our attitudes and how we can be accountable for them. Additionally, we’ll discuss non-attitudinal responsibility and its relevance to ethics and epistemology. The concept refers to the responsibility we have for our beliefs. The text delves into the complexity of this responsibility, drawing parallels with the responsibility we assume for the consequences of our actions. It also addresses doxastic influence, the relationship between beliefs and actions, and the idea of non-attitudinal responsibility. The author draws inspiration from Peels’ work (2017) and argues that we are responsible for our beliefs, and by understanding the reasons behind them, we can comprehend our attitudes. The discussion is enriched with examples and philosophical reflections.
References
BEROFSKY, B. Liberdade da Necessidade. Nova York: Routledge e Kegan, 1987.
BOOTH, A. R. On Some Recent Moves in Defense of Doxastic Compatibilism. Synthese, v. 191, n. 8, p. 1867-1880, 2014.
HIERONYMI, P. Believing at will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v. 29, n. 1, p. 36–52, 2005.
HIERONYMI, P. Responsibility for believing. Synthese, v. 161, n. 3, p. 357–373, 2008.
MATTHEN, N. Como ter certeza: exploração sensorial e certeza empírica. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 88, n. 1, p. 38-69, 2014.
McHUGH, C. Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency. Philosophical Issues, v. 24, n. 1, p. 132-157, 2014.
McHUGH, C. The illusion of doxastic agency. Philosophical Topics, v. 43, n. 1, p. 179–206, 2015.
MIRANDA, J. D. C. Danos Ambientais: da Responsabilidade Civil e das formas de Reparação. Âmbito Jurídico, 1 de fevereiro de 2022. Disponível em: https://ambitojuridico.com.br/danos-ambientais-formas-de-reparacao/.
PEELS, R. Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Filosofia e Pesquisa fenomenológica, v. 89, n. 3, p. 679-702, 2014.
PEELS, R. The Consequential Conception of Doxastic. New York: Routledge; Oxford University Press 2017.
STRAWSON, P. F. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, v. 48, p. 1-25, 1962.
WATSON, G. Two faces of responsibility. Philosophical Topics, v. 24, n. 2, p. 227–248, 1996.
WEATHERSON, B. The role of epistemic virtues in responsible belief. Manuscrito não publicado, 2019.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Kairós: Revista Acadêmica da Prainha
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
According to the Creative Commons International 4.0 License, it is possible to:
1) Distribute the published material in any format, as long as the publication and referencing credits are duly given to Revista Kairós.
2) The copyright on the articles, reviews and translations published are from Revista Kairós, as well as the rights of first publication.
3) Authors who want to publish their manuscripts published in Kairós in other media (book chapters, for example), must duly refer to the first publication in Revista Kairós.
4) Authors have full right to publish their manuscripts published in Revista Kairós on their personal pages, and it is recommended to mention the journal.
To check the provisions of the Creative Commons 4.0 License, access here.
